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Abstract
We propose a method to study the secrecy constraints in key generation problems where side information might be present
at untrusted users. Our method is inspired by a recent work of Hayashi and Tan who used the Re´nyi divergence as the secrecy
measure to study the output statistics of applying hash functions to a random sequence. By generalizing the achievability result
of Hayashi and Tan to the multi-terminal case, we obtain the output statistics of applying hash functions to multiple random
sequences, which turn out to be an important tool in the achievability proof of strong secrecy capacity regions of key generation
problems with side information at untrusted users. To illustrate the power of our method, we derive the capacity region of the
multiple private key generation problem with an untrusted helper for continuous memoryless sources under Markov conditions.
The converse proof of our result follows by generalizing a result of Nitinawarat and Narayan to the case with side information
at untrusted users.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of generating a secret key for two parties observing correlated random variables was first considered by
Maurer [1] and by Ahlswede and Csisza´r [2]. In [1], [2], there are two legitimate users Alice and Bob as well as an eavesdropper
Eve. Alice observes a source sequence An1 , Bob observes A
n
2 and Eve observes A
n
3 . It is assumed that there exists noiseless
public channel over which Alice and Bob can talk interactively in r rounds. The eavesdropper, although not allowed to talk,
can overhear the messages transmitted over the public channel. Under the condition that A1−A3−A2 forms a Markov chain,
it is shown that the secret key capacity (maximal rate of the secret key) is I(A1;A2|A3) for discrete memoryless sources
(DMS).
Subsequently in [3], Csisza´r and Narayan extended the model in [1], [2] by adding a third party called a helper which assists
the legitimate users to generate a secret key. Furthermore, the authors in [4] generalized the result in [3] to a setting with at
least four terminals. It is assumed in [4] that there exist an eavesdropper Eve and other T ≥ 3 terminals denoted by T . For
each t ∈ T , terminal t observes a source sequence Ant , which is correlated with all other source sequences {A
n
i }i∈T :i6=t. The
eavesdropper observes a correlated source sequence En. Let S andW denote two disjoint group of users, i.e., S
⋂
W = ∅. All
users in S aim to generate a common key K with the help of all other users in T . Interactive communication with unlimited
rate is assumed and the overall communication over the public channel is denoted as F. The authors in [4] considered three
problems depending the security constraint on the key. If the key is only concealed from the public messages F, the problem is
a secret key generation problem. If the key is concealed from both the public messages F and the source sequences observed
by users W , then the problem is a private key generation problem. If the key is concealed from both the public messages F
and the source sequence observed by the eavesdropper, the problem is considered as a wiretap key generation problem. Using
results in the distributed source coding [5, Theorem 3.1.14], Csisza´r and Narayan [4] characterizes the exact capacity for the
secret key and private key generation problems as well as bounds on the wiretap key capacity. Furthermore, the authors proved
an upper bound on the secret key capacity and conjectured the upper bound is tight in general. The conjecture was solved
partially by Ye and Reznik [6] and proved to be true by Chan and Zheng [7]. Other works on the secret key generation include
[8]–[15].
The problem of generating multiple keys was initialized by Ye and Narayan in [16] where they considered the generation
of a private key and a secret key with three terminals. The authors proved an outer bound on the capacity region which was
later shown to be tight by Zhang et al. [17]. Furthermore, in [18], the authors considered generating two keys in a cellular
model and derived the capacity region for four cases depending on the security constraints on the keys. Other works on the
multiple key generation problem include [19]–[21]. In terms of key generation problems for correlated Gaussian memoryless
sources (GMS), Nitinawarat and Narayan [22] derived the capacity for secret key generation with multi-terminals and thus
extended [4, Theorem 2] to GMS. Watanabe and Oohama derived the capacity for secret key generation for GMS and vector
GMS under rate-limited public communication in [23] and [24] respectively. Other works on secret key generation for GMS
include [25]–[27].
In this paper, we are interested in the private key generation problem for correlated continuous memoryless sources (CMS)
with a helper and unlimited public discussion. To the best of our knowledge, the private key generation problem for CMS
remains unexplored.
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2The main challenges of private key generation problems for CMS lie in the analysis of the secrecy constraints in the
achievability part since we need to upper bound the term I(K;An,F) where K is the private key, F is the public message
and An is an continuous i.i.d. sequence observed by some untrusted helpers. To bound I(K;An,F), existing works, e.g.,
[15], [26], [27], applied quantization to the continuous side information An and relied heavily on the continuity of information
quantities. The analyses are usually tedious.
In contrast, inspired by [11] and [28], we analyze the secrecy part in the private key generation problem for CMS by studying
the output statistics of hash functions (random binning) under the Re´nyi divergence measure and using the fact that the Re´nyi
divergence is non-decreasing in the order [29]. The great advantage of our proposed method is that it is a unified and neat
method which holds for the case with either continuous, discrete or no side information at untrusted users. We believe that
our result in Lemma 1 can be used to significantly simplify the security analysis for secret key generation problems when the
eavesdropper has access to continuous (e.g., Gaussian) side information which are correlated to the observations at legitimate
users (e.g., [15], [26], [27]). Furthermore, our proposed method can be used to derive bounds on the convergence speed of
secrecy constraints beyond the fact that secrecy constraints vanish under certain rate constraints. See the remark after Theorem
2 for further discussion.
A. Main Contributions
Our main contributions are summarized as follows.
Firstly, we derive the output statistics of applying hash functions to multiple random sequences under the Re´nyi divergence
measure in Lemma 1. Lemma 1 is an extension of [11, Theorem 1] to a multi-terminal case and a strict generalization of [30,
Theorem 1] where the output statistics of random binning under the total variational distance measure was derived. Furthermore,
Lemma 1 turns out to be an important tool in analyzing secrecy constraints in key generation problems, especially when the
key needs to be protected from continuous observations correlated to observations at legitimate users.
Secondly, to illustrate the power of Lemma 1, we derive the capacity region for the multiple private key generation problem
with a helper for CMS. To be specific, we revisit the model in [18] and derive the capacity region for CMS under a symmetric
security requirement which did not appear in [18]. The converse proof follows by judiciously adapting the techniques in [22,
Theorem 1] to our setting. In the achievability proof, we use Lemma 1 to analyze the secrecy constraints on generated keys
which need to be protected from correlated continuous observations of illegitimate users. Furthermore, we use the quantization
techniques in [22], the large deviations analysis for distributed source coding in [31], the Fourier Motzkin Elimination and the
techniques to bound the difference between the differential entropy of CMS and the discrete entropy of the quantized random
variables. We remark that the techniques used in our paper can also apply to strengthen all the four cases in [18] with strong
secrecy and for CMS. Furthermore, we also extend our result to a cellular model involving more than four terminals and derive
inner and outer bounds for the capacity region.
B. Organization of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I-B, we set up the notation. In Section II, we formulate the problem
of output statistics of hash functions and present our main result under the Re´nyi divergence measure in Lemma 1. Subsequently
in Section III, invoking Lemma 1, we derive the capacity region for the multiple private key generation problem with a helper.
Furthermore, we generalize our result to a cellular model and derive bounds on the capacity region. The proofs of the capacity
region for the multiple private key generation with a helper are given Sections IV and V. Finally, we conclude our paper and
discuss future research directions in Section VI. For the smooth presentation of our main results, the proofs of all supporting
lemmas are deferred to the appendices.
Notation
Throughout the paper, random variables and their realizations are in capital (e.g., X) and lower case (e.g., x) respectively.
All sets are denoted in calligraphic font (e.g., X ). We use X c to denote the complement of X and use UX to denote the
uniform distribution over X . Given any two integers a, b, we use [a : b] to denote the set of all integers between a and b and
we use [a] to denote [1 : a] for any integer a ≥ 1. Let T := {1, . . . , T }. Given a sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . . , XT
and any subset S ⊆ T , we use XS and {Xt}t∈S interchangeably. Furthermore, let Xn := (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random vector
of length n. For any (a, b) ∈ [1 : n]2, we use Xba and (Xa, . . . , Xb) interchangeably. For information theoretical quantities,
we follow [32].
II. OUTPUT STATISTICS OF HASH FUNCTIONS
In this subsection, we consider hash functions and study its output statistics under the Re´nyi divergence measure. The result
in this section (cf. Lemma 1) serves as an important tool in the subsequent analysis for key generation problems.
3A. Preliminary
Before presenting the main result, we first introduce some definitions. Given two distributions (PA1 , QA1) defined an alphabet
A1, the KL divergence is defines as
D(PA1‖QA1) :=
∑
a1∈A1
PA1(a1) log
PA1(a1)
QA1(a1)
. (1)
Furthermore, given s ∈ [−1,∞), the Re´nyi divergence or order 1 + s is defined as
D1+s(PA1‖QA1) :=
{
1
s
log
∑
a1∈A1
P 1+sA1 (a1)Q
−s
A1
(a1) s 6= 0,
D(PA1‖QA1) s = 0.
(2)
It is well known that D1+s(PA1‖QA1) is non-decreasing in s (cf. [29]) and thus D(PA1‖QA1) ≤ D1+s(PA1‖QA1) for all
s ≥ 0.
Given a joint distribution PA1E on the alphabet A1 × E , the conditional entropy is defined as
H(A1|E) := −
∑
e∈E
PE(e)
∑
a1∈A1
PA1|E(a1|e) logPA1|E(a1|e). (3)
Furthermore, given s ∈ [−1,∞), the conditional Re´nyi entropy of order 1 + s is defined as
H1+s(A1|E) :=
{
− 1
s
log
∑
e PE(e)
∑
a1
P 1+s
A1|E
(a1|e) s 6= 0,
H(A1|E) s = 0,
(4)
and the Gallager’s conditional Re´nyi entropy of order s is defined as
H↑1+s(A1|E) := −
1 + s
s
log
∑
e
(∑
a1
P 1+sA1E(a1, e)
) 1
1+s
. (5)
We remark that for continuous random variables, the summations in (2), (4), (5) should be replaced by integrals.
We then recall the formal definition of a hash function [33, Eq. (1)] (see also [34], [35]).
Definition 1. Given an arbitrary set A and the set M := {1, . . . ,M}, a random hash function fX is a stochastic mapping
from A to M, where X denotes the random variable describing the stochastic behavior of the hash function. Given any
ε ∈ R+, an ensemble of random hash functions fX is called an ε-almost universal2 hash function if it satisfies that for any
distinct (a1, a2) ∈ A2, we have
Pr{fX(a1) = fX(a2)} ≤
ε
M
. (6)
When ε = 1, we say that the ensemble of functions is a universal2 hash function.
We remark that random binning in source coding problems (e.g., [32, Chapter 15.4.1]) is a universal2 hash function.
B. Output Statistics
In this subsection, we study the output statistic of applying hash functions to multiple random sequences under the Re´nyi
divergence measure. For simplicity, we use T to denote the set {1, . . . , T }. Consider a sequence of random variables (AT , E) =
(A1, . . . , AT , E) with a joint distribution PAT E defined on an alphabet
∏
t∈T At × E where all t ∈ T , the alphabet At is
finite. Let (AnT , E
n) be an i.i.d sequence generated according to the distribution PAT E .
For each t ∈ T , let f
(n)
Xt
be an ε-almost universal2 hash function mapping fromAnt toMt := {1, . . . , Nt} whereXt describes
the stochastic behavior of the hash function. Furthermore, the rate of the hash function fXt is defined as Rt :=
1
n
logNt. We
are interested in the output statistics of applying hash functions to the random sequences AnT , i.e., {f
(n)
Xt
(Ant )}t∈T .
For ease of notation, let Mt := f
(n)
Xt
(Ant ) for each t ∈ T . Furthermore, for each t ∈ T , let UMt denote the uniform
distribution over Mt and let PMt denotes the induced output distribution by P
n
At
and the hash function fXt , i.e., for all
mt ∈ Mt,
PMt(mt) =
∑
ant ∈A
n
t
PnAt(a
n
t )1{fXt(a
n
t ) = mt}. (7)
To quantify the output statistics of the hash functions, it is common to use the KL divergence D(PMT En‖
∏
t∈T UMt × P
n
E)
as a measure where
D(PMT En‖
∏
t∈T
UMt × P
n
E) = D(PMT ‖
∏
t∈T
UMt) + I(MT ;E
n) (8)
=
∑
t∈T :t≥2
I(Mt;M[1:t−1]) +
∑
t∈T
D(PMt‖UMt) + I(MT ;E
n). (9)
4Note that if D(PMT En‖
∏
t∈T UMt × P
n
E) < δ for some δ > 0, then we have the following results
(i)
∑T
t∈T :t≥2 I(Mt;M[1:t−1]) is small, indicating that the output of hash functions Mt1 and M
n
t2
are almost independent
for all distinct pairs (t1, t2) ∈ T
2;
(ii)
∑
t∈T D(PMt‖UMt) is small, indicating that the output of each hash function Mt is almost uniform over Mt for all
t ∈Mt;
(iii) I(MT ;E
n) is small, indicating that the collection of outputs of hash functions MT = (M1, . . . ,MT ) is almost
independent of the side information En.
In this subsection, instead of using (9), we make use of the Re´nyi divergence of order 1 + s (cf. (2)) as the measure of
output statistics of hash functions, i.e.,
C1+s(MT |E
n) := D1+s(PMT En‖
∏
t∈T
UMt × P
n
E) (10)
=
∑
t∈T
logMt −H1+s(MT |E
n), (11)
where s ∈ (0, 1] (11) follows from (4). Note that the measure in (11) is a strict generalization of that in (9).
Our results in the following lemma concern the output statistics of ε-almost universal2 hash functions for any ε ∈ R+ unless
otherwise stated.
Lemma 1. The following claims hold.
(i) For any s ∈ [0, 1]
EXT
[
exp(sC1+s(MT |E
n))
]
≤ εsT +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
εs(T−|S|)
(∏
i∈S
Nst
)
exp(−snH1+s(AS |E)). (12)
(ii) For any s ∈ [0, 1], if for all non-empty subset S of T ,∑
t∈S
Rt < H1+s(AS |E) (13)
then
lim
n→∞
1
n
EXT
[
C1+s(MT |E
n)
]
= 0; (14)
(iii) When ε = 1, for any s ∈ [0, 1]
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEXT [C1+s(MT |E
n)] ≥ max
θ∈[s,1]
min
∅6=S⊆T
θ(H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt). (15)
Note that the asymptotic performance in Claim (iii) is achieved only by (1-almost) universal2 hash functions since we put
the additional constraint of ε = 1. This condition could potentially be relaxed with techniques in [36].
The proof of Lemma 1 is inspired by [11, Theorem 1], [28, Lemma 1 and Theorem 2] and provided in Appendix A. A few
remarks are in order.
Firstly, Lemma 1 is a generalization of [11, Theorem 1] to multi-terminal. In the proof of Lemma 1, we also borrow an
idea from [30, Theorem 1] which studied the output statistics of universal2 hash functions under the total variation distance
measure instead of the Re´nyi divergence considered here. Invoking (17) and Pinsker’s inequality, it is easy to see that that [30,
Theorem 1] is indeed a corollary of Lemma 1.
Secondly, since the Re´nyi divergence D1+s(·) is a non-decreasing s and thus for all s ≥ 0,
D(PMT En‖
∏
t∈T
UMt × P
n
E) = C1(MT |E
n) (16)
≤ C1+s(MT |E
n). (17)
Thus, our results in Lemma 1 can be used to analyze the secrecy constraints in key generation problems if the constraints are
expressed in terms of KL divergences or mutual information terms as in existing literature.
It is not apparent how one can use Lemma 1 for this purpose. To illustrate this, in the following, we briefly discuss the case
in a private key generation problem involving three terminals: two legitimate users Alice and Bob, observing sequences An1 and
An2 respectively, and one illegitimate user Eve who has access to side information A
n. Let F denote the public communication
between Alice and Bob and let K denote the secret key generated by them. To make sure the generated key is secure, we need
I(K;An,F) to be small and to make sure the generated key is uniform, we need to make D(PK‖UK) to be small where UK
is the uniform distribution over the alphabet of the secret key.
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Fig. 1. Multiple Private key Generation with a Helper [18].
Note that in key generation problems, in the achievability part, the public communication F is usually the random binning
(M1,M2) of observations (A
n
1 , A
n
2 ) at legitimate users and the secret key K is usually obtained by applying a hash function
on a commonly agreed binning sequence (which is correlated with (An1 , A
n
2 )). Thus, we have that
D(PKAnF‖PU × PAnPF) = D(PK‖UK) + I(K;A
n,M1,M2) (18)
≤ D(PKM1M2An‖UK ×UM1UM2 × P
n
A), (19)
where UMi , i ∈ [2] is the uniform distribution over the alphabet of random binning.
Therefore, using Lemma 1 and (17), we have
• if (13) is satisfied, then the secrecy constraint satisfies 1
n
D(PKAnF‖UK × PAnF) vanishes to zero as n → ∞ and thus
ensures weak secrecy;
• if the right hand side of (15) is always positive, then the secrecy constraint D(PKAnF‖UK ×PAnF) decays exponentially
fast and thus ensures strong secrecy.
In the remaining of this paper, to illustrate in detail how the result in Lemma 1 can be used in analyses of secrecy constraints,
we consider a multiple private key generation problem and derive the capacity region for the problem under mild conditions.
III. PRIVATE KEY CAPACITY REGION FOR CMS
A. Multiple Private Key Generation with a Helper
Let PA0A1A2A3 be a joint probability density function (pdf) of random variables (A0, A1, A2, A3) defined on a continuous
alphabet A0 ×A1 ×A2 ×A3. We assume that the pdf PA0A1A2A3 satisfies that for any non-empty set S ⊆ {0, 1, 2, 3}, the
(joint) differential entropy h(AS) is finite, i.e.,
|h(AS)| = |h({At}t∈S)| <∞. (20)
Let (An0 , A
n
1 , A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) be a sequence of continuous random variables generated i.i.d. according to a pdf PA0A1A2A3 .
In this subsection, we revisit the multiple key generation model [18] by studied Zhang et al. as shown in Figure 1. In this
model, there are four terminals: Alice has access to An1 , Bob has access to A
n
0 , Charlie has access to A
n
2 and Helen has access
to An3 . It is assumed that there is a noiseless public channel and all terminals talk interactively in r rounds. Let the overall
messages transmitted over the public channel be F := (F1, . . . , F4r). For j = {1, . . . , 4r}, Fj is a function of A
n
t and previous
messages F j−1 where t = j mod 4.
Let the alphabet of secret keys be Kt := {1, . . . ,Kt} for t ∈ [2]. Using the public messages F and the source sequence An1 ,
Alice generates a private key KA ∈ K1. Using (F, An0 ), Bob generates private keys (KBA,KBC) ∈ K1 ×K2. Using (F, A
n
2 ),
Charlie generates KC ∈ K2. We require that Alice and Bob agree on a private private key while Charlie and Bob agree on
another private key, i.e. KA = KBA and KC = KBC. A private key generation protocol consists of the public communication
F. Note that in the above model, Helen is an untrusted helper who helps other terminals by transmitting messages over the
public channel so that other terminals can obtain common sequences for subsequent key generations.
In [18], the authors considered four models with different secrecy requirements for discrete memoryless sources, depending
on whether (KA,KC) is known by Helen and whether KC is known by Alice. Our setting differs from [18] in the following
two aspects:
(i) We consider different secrecy requirements on generated keys. To be specific, we require the private key KA is only
known by Alice and Bob and the private key KC is only known by Bob and Charlie.
(ii) We consider continuous memoryless sources, which requires different techniques in the analyses and derivation of
fundamental limits concerning the performance of optimal protocols.
We then give a formal definition of the capacity region of multiple private key generation with a helper, which concerns the
asymptotic fundamental limits of optimal protocols.
6Definition 2. A pair (R1, R2) is said to be an achievable private key rate pair if there exists a sequence of private key
generation protocols such that
lim
n→∞
max
{
Pr{KA 6= KBA},Pr{KC 6= KBC}
}
= 0, (21)
lim
n→∞
D(PKAAn2An3F‖UK1 × PAn2An3 F) = 0, (22)
lim
n→∞
D(PKCAn1An3F‖UK2 × PAn1An3 F) = 0, (23)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KA) ≥ R1, lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KC) ≥ R2. (24)
The closure of all achievable private key rate pairs is called the private key capacity region and denoted as CMP.
Note that (22), (23) imply that i) the generated key KA is almost uniform over K1 and independent of (F, An2 , A
n
3 ) and
ii) KC is almost uniform over K2 and independent of (F, A
n
1 , A
n
3 ). Furthermore, the secrecy requirements in (22), (23) are
strong in contrast to the weak ones in [18].
To present our result, we need the following definition. Let R∗ be the set of pairs (R1, R2) such that
R1 ≤ I(A1;A0|A2, A3), (25)
R2 ≤ I(A2;A0|A1, A3), (26)
R1 +R2 ≤ I(A1, A2;A0|A3)− I(A1;A2|A3), (27)
where the mutual information is calculated with respect to the pdf PA0A1A2A3 or its induced pdfs.
Theorem 2. The secrecy capacity region with an untrusted helper satisfies that
R∗ ⊆ CMP. (28)
The proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section IV. In the achievability proof, we first quantize the continuous source sequence
similarly as in the proof of [22, Theorem 1]. Then, the terminals communicate over the public channel so that the quantized
version of (An0 , A
n
1 ) are decoded almost surely by Bob who observes A
n
0 . The reliability analysis (cf. (21)) for key agreement
proceeds similarly as the error exponent analysis for Slepian-Wolf coding introduced in [31]. The secrecy analysis (cf. (22), (22))
follows by invoking (15) in Lemma 1. Subsequently, we need to apply Fourier Motzkin Elimination to obtain the conditions
on achievable rate pairs. Finally, as the quantization level goes to infinity, we show that any rate pair inside R∗ is achievable
by exploring the relationship between the differential entropy of continuous random variables and the discrete entropy of the
quantized random variables.
We remark that Theorem 2 holds also for DMS, as can be gleaned from the proof. Furthermore, we can derive the achievable
reliability-secrecy exponent which is positive for rate pairs inside R∗. We remark that Lemma 1, especially Eq. (15), is critical
to derive secrecy exponents [11], [12] for key generation problems of DMS. This means that, we can not only show that Eq.
(22) and Eq. (23) hold, but also derive a lower bound on the speed at which the secrecy constraints in Eq. (22) and Eq. (23)
vanish to zero exponentially as the length of observed sequences tends to infinity. This is yet another advantage of our method
beyond quantization based techniques in [15] which could only be used to show that secrecy constraints vanish to zero but
not the manner or the rate of decay.
Corollary 3. For any pdf PA0A1A2A3 such that the Markov chain A1 −A3 −A2 holds, we have that CMP = R
∗.
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in Section V. When the Markov chain A1 −A3 −A2 holds, we have I(A1;A2|A3) = 0.
The achievability part follows from Theorem 2 and the converse part follows by judiciously adapting the converse techniques
in [22] to our setting. We remark that the proof techniques used to prove Theorem 2 and Corollary 3 can also be applied to
all the four models in [18] and thus show that the capacity results in [18] also hold for CMS with strong secrecy.
B. Generalization to a Cellular Model
Recall that T = {1, . . . , T }. For each t ∈ T , define an alphabet of keys as Kt := {1, . . . ,Kt}. Let (AT , A0) be distributed
according to a joint pdf PA0AT with zero mean vector and covariance matrix Σ. In this subsection, we consider a cellular
model where there is a base station and T terminals. This model is a generalization of our setting in Section III-A in the spirit
of [4] and has potential applications in internet of things where multiple terminals need to generate private keys with the help
of other (potentially untrusted) terminals.
The base station observes the source sequence An0 and for t ∈ T , terminal t observes the source sequence A
n
t . Fix arbitrary
subset S of T . For each t ∈ S, terminal t aims to generate a private key with the base station, concealed from all other
terminals. We assume that the public communication is done in r rounds over a noiseless public channel which is accessed
by all terminals. Let F denote the overall communication over the public channel. For each t ∈ S, given F and Ant , terminal
t generates a private key KP,t ∈ Kt. Furthermore, given An0 and F, the base station generates a sequence of private keys
7{KB,t}t∈S . The goal of a good protocol is to enable the base station and each terminal t ∈ S to generate an agreed private
key, which is concealed from all other terminals.
The capacity region for this cellular model is defined as follows.
Definition 3. A tuple RS = {Rt}t∈S is said to an achievable private key rate tuple if there exists a sequence of private key
generation protocols (F) such that for each t ∈ S,
lim
n→∞
Pr{KP,t 6= KB,t} = 0, (29)
lim
n→∞
D(PKP,tFAnT ⋂{t}c‖UKt × PFA
n
T
⋂
{t}c
) = 0, (30)
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KP,t) ≥ Rt. (31)
The closure of the set of all achievable private key rate tuples is called the private key capacity region and denoted as CCP.
Before presenting the main results, we need the following definitions. Note that for U ⊆ S, U
⋃
Uc = T .
Rin :=
{
RS : ∀ ∅ 6= U ⊆ S :
∑
t∈U
Rt ≤
∑
t∈U
h(At|AT
⋂
{t}c)− h(AU |AUc , A0)
}
(32)
Rout :=
{
RS : ∀ ∅ 6= U ⊆ S :
∑
t∈U
Rt ≤ h(AU |AUc)− h(AU |AUc , A0)
}
. (33)
Theorem 4. The private key capacity region in the Cellular model satisfies that
Rin ⊆ CCP ⊆ Rout. (34)
The proof of Theorem 4 is omitted since it is a generalization of the proofs of Theorem 2 and Corollary 3. In fact, we can
recover the result in 2 and Corollary 3 by letting T = {1, 2, 3} and S = {1, 2}.
Here we provide only the proof sketch. In the achievability proof, we need to first quantize the source sequence at each
terminal t ∈ T and thus obtain Bnt . Then, for t ∈ S, terminal t sends a message Mt ∈ Mt over the public channel and
generates a private key KP,t using B
n
t . For t ∈ S
c, terminal t sends the complete quantized source sequence. Thus, the public
message F = (MS , B
n
Sc). Given A
n
0 and F, the base station estimates B
n
S and generate private key KB,t using F and the
estimated sequences Bˆnt for all t ∈ S. The error probability in key agreement is derived by using the distributed source coding
idea and the secrecy analysis is done by invoking (15) in Lemma 1. Let R˜t be the rate of the message at terminal t and let
the quantization interval go to zero. To satisfy (29) and (30), we conclude that the rates should satisfy that for any positive δ,
Rt + R˜t ≤ H(At|AT
⋂
{t}c)− δ, (35)∑
j∈U
R˜j ≥ H(AU |AUc , A0) + δ. (36)
for each t ∈ S and for each non-empty subset U of S. Without loss of generality, we can assume that S = {1, . . . , |S|}.
By applying the Fourier Motzkin Elimination successively to eliminate R˜t for all t ∈ S, we conclude that any RS ∈ Rin is
achievable.
The converse proof proceeds similarly as Corollary 3 by assuming that there exists a super terminal observing AnU and
generating secret keys KP,U := {KP,t}t∈U for each non-empty subset U of S. This is possible since T is finite and (30)
implies that for any non-empty subset U of S, we have that for any positive δ and sufficiently large n,
D(PKP,UFAnUc ‖
∏
t∈U
UMt × PFAnUc ) ≤
∑
t∈U
∑
t∈U
D(PKP,tFAnT ⋂{t}c ‖UKt × PFAnT ⋂{t}c ) (37)
≤ |U|δ ≤ Tδ. (38)
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Throughout this section, we set T = {1, 2, 3}.
A. Coding Strategy
Fix an integer q. Let gq : R → [0, 1, . . . , 2q2] be a quantization function with quantization level ∆ =
1
q
such that gq(a) = 0
if a ≤ −q or a > q and gq(a) = ⌈q(q + a)⌉ if a ∈ (−q, q]. Note that the quantized random variable has a finite alphabet
B = [0, 1, . . . , 2q2] with the size 2q2 + 1. Applying the quantization function Q on all {At}t∈T to obtain quantized version
{Bt}t∈T . We first quantize the sequences Ant using the function gq and obtain corresponding quantized sequencesB
n
t = gq(A
n
t )
for t = 0, 1, 2, 3.
Let X5 = (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5) be a sequence of independent random variables. Let fXt be an universal2 random hash
function mapping from Bnt to Mt = {1, . . . , Nt} for t = 1, 2, 3 where Xt describes the stochastic behavior of the hash
8function. Similarly, let fXt+3 be random hash function mapping from B
n
t to Kt = {1, . . . ,Kt} for t = 1, 2. Furthermore, for
any positive δ, let logNt = nR˜t for t = 1, 2, 3 and logKt = nRt for t = 1, 2.
Codebook Generation: The code book generated by Alice is CA :=
⋃
an1A
n
1
(fX1(gq(a
n
1 )), fX4(gq(a
n
1 ))). The codebook gener-
ated by Charlie is CC :=
⋃
an2A
n
2
(fX2(gq(a
n
2 )), fX5(gq(a
n
2 ))). The codebook generated by Helen is CH :=
⋃
an3A
n
3
fX3(gq(a
n
3 )).
The random codebook CX5 := {CA, CC, CH} controlled by random variables X
5 is assumed to be known by all users Alice,
Bob, Charlie and Helen.
Encoding: Recall that Bnt = gq(A
n
t ) for t = 0, 1, 2, 3. Given A
n
1 , Alice sends m1 := fX1(B
n
1 ) over the public channel and
takes fX4(B
n
1 ) as the private key KA. Given A
n
2 , Charlie sends m2 := fX2(B
n
2 ) and takes fX5(B
n
2 ) as the private key KC.
Given An3 , Helen sends m3 := fX3(B
n
3 ) over the public channel.
Decoding: Let PB0B1B1B3 be induced by PA0A1A2A3 and the quantization function gq. Given the messages F = (m1,m2,m3)
transmitted over the public discussion channel and the source sequence An0 , Bob uses maximum likelihood decoding to obtain
(Bˆn1 , Bˆ
n
2 , Bˆ
n
3 ), i.e.,
(Bˆn1 , Bˆ
n
2 , Bˆ
n
3 ) := argmax
(b˜n1 ,b˜
n
2 ,b˜
n
3 ):
fXt (b˜
n
t )=mt, t=1,2,3
PnB1B2B3|B0(b˜
n
1 , b˜
n
2 , b˜
n
3 |B
n
0 ). (39)
Then, Bob claims that KBA = fX4(Bˆ
n
1 ) and KBC = fX5(Bˆ
n
3 ).
B. Analysis of Error Probability in Key Agreement
Given the above coding strategy, we obtain that
max
{
Pr{KA 6= KBA},Pr{KC 6= KBC}
}
≤ Pr
{
(Bˆn1 , Bˆ
n
2 , Bˆ
n
3 ) 6= (B
n
1 , B
n
2 , B
n
3 )
}
. (40)
Note that the average is not only over all possible realizations of source sequences but also over all possible random universal2
hash functions. Recall that in this section T = {1, 2, 3} and all the quantized random variable have the same alphabet B.
Given ∅ 6= S ⊆ T and an0 ∈ R
n, define the error events:
ES :=
{
b˜nT ∈ B
3n : ∀ t ∈ T , fXt(b˜
n
t ) = mt, ∀ t ∈ S, b˜
n
t 6= B
n
t ,
∀ t ∈ T
⋂
Sc, b˜nt = B
n
t , P
n
BT |B0
(b˜nT |B
n
0 ) ≥ P
n
BT |B0
(BnT |B
n
0 )
}
. (41)
Then, similarly as [31], we have that for any ∅ 6= S ⊆ T and arbitrary s ∈ [0, 1],
Pr
{
∃b˜nT ∈ ES
}
= EXS
[∑
bnT
PnBT (b
n
T ) Pr
{
∃b˜nT ∈ ES |b
n
T
}]
(42)
≤
∑
bn0 ,b
n
T
PnB0,BT (b
n
0 , b
n
T )
(∑
b˜nS
1{PnBT |B0(b˜
n
S , b
n
T
⋂
Sc |b
n
0 ) ≥ P
n
BT |B0
(bnT |b
n
0 )}EXS
[
1{fXt(b˜
n
t ) = f
n
Xt
(bnt ), t ∈ S}
])s
(43)
≤
∑
bn0 ,b
n
T
PnB0,BT (b
n
0 , b
n
T )
(∑
b˜nS
PnBS |B0BT ⋂ Sc (b˜
n
S |b
n
0 , b
n
T
⋂
Sc)
Pn
BS |B0BT
⋂
Sc
(bnK|b
n
0 b
n
T
⋂
Sc)
×
∏
t∈S
1
Mt
)s
(44)
≤ exp
(
− ns
(∑
t∈S
R˜t −H
↑
1+s(BS |B0, BT
⋂
Kc)
)
, (45)
where (45) follows from the definition in (5). Thus, invoking (40) and (45), we obtain that
max
{
Pr{KA 6= KBA},Pr{KC 6= KBC}
}
≤
∑
∅6=S⊆T
Pr
{
∃b˜nT ∈ ES
}
(46)
≤
∑
∅6=S⊆T
exp
{
− n max
s∈[0,1]
s
(∑
t∈S
R˜t −H
↑
1+s(BS |B0, BSc)
)}
(47)
≤ (2T − 1)× exp
{
− n min
∅6=S⊆T
max
s∈[0,1]
s
(∑
t∈S
R˜t −H
↑
1+s(BS |B0, BSc)
)}
. (48)
9C. Analysis of Secrecy Requirement
Recall that UMt is the uniform distribution over Mt for t = 1, 2, 3 and let UKt be the uniform distribution over Kt for
t = 1, 2. In the following, for simplicity, we will use Mt to denote fXt(B
n
t ) for t = 1, 2, 3. Given the coding strategy, we
have
D(PKAAn2An3 F‖UK1 × PAn2An3F) = D(PKA‖UK1) + I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,M3) (49)
= D(PKA‖UK1) + I(KA;M1) + I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,M2,M3|M1) (50)
≤ D(PKA‖UK1) + I(KA;M1) + I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) (51)
≤ D(PKAM1An2An3 ‖UK1 × PU1 × P
n
A2,A3
). (52)
where (51) holds because M2 is a function of A
n
2 and M3 is a function of A
n
3 , thus
I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,M2,M3|M1) = I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,M2,M3)− I(M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,M2,M3) (53)
= I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 )− I(M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) (54)
≤ I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ); (55)
(52) holds because
D(PKAM1An2An3 ‖UK1 × PU1 × P
n
A2,A3
)
= D(PKAM1An2An3 ‖PKAM1 × P
n
A2,A3
) +D(PKAM1 × P
n
A2,A3
‖UK1 × PU1 × P
n
A2,A3
) (56)
= I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) + I(KA;M1) +D(PKA‖UK1) +D(PM1‖PU1) (57)
≥ I(KA,M1;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) + I(KA;M1) +D(PKA‖UK1). (58)
Using the result in (52) and invoking (15) in Lemma 1 by replacing E with (A2, A3), we obtain that
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEX5
[
D(PKAAn2An3F‖UK1 × PAn2An3 F)
]
≥ max
θ∈[0,1]
θ
(
H1+θ(B1|A2, A3)−R1 − R˜1
)
. (59)
Similarly as (59), we have
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEX5
[
D(PKCAn1An3 F‖UK2 × PAn1An3 F)
]
≥ max
θ∈[0,1]
θ
(
H1+θ(B2|A1, A3)−R2 − R˜2
)
. (60)
D. Analysis of Capacity Region
Lemma 5. Using the results in (48), (59) and (60), we conclude that if (R1, R2, R˜1, R˜2, R˜3) satisfies that for any positive δ,∑
t∈S
R˜t ≥ H(BS |BSc , B0) + δ, ∀ ∅ 6= S ⊆ T , (61)
R1 + R˜1 ≤ H(B1|A2, A3)− δ, (62)
R2 + R˜2 ≤ H(B2|A1, A3)− δ, (63)
then
min
∅6=S⊆T
max
s∈[0,1]
s
(∑
t∈S
R˜t −H
↑
1+s(BS |B0, BSc)
)
> 0, (64)
max
θ∈[0,1]
θ
(
H1+θ(B1|A2, A3)−R1 − R˜1
)
> 0, (65)
max
θ∈[0,1]
θ
(
H1+θ(B1|A2, A3)−R1 − R˜1
)
> 0, (66)
The proof of Lemma 5 follows from the properties of Re´nyi conditional entropy and thus omitted. By applying Fourier
Motzkin Elimination to (61) to (63), we obtain that (R1, R2) should satisfy that
R1 ≤ H(B1|A2, A3)−H(B1|B0, B2, B3)− 2δ, (67)
R2 ≤ H(B2|A1, A3)−H(B2|B0, B1, B3)− 2δ, (68)
R1 +R2 ≤ H(B1|A2, A3) +H(B2|A1, A3)−H(B1, B2|B0, B3)− 4δ. (69)
Recall that ∆ = 1
q
is the quantization interval. Similarly as [22, Lemma 3.1] (see also [32, Theorem 8.3.1]), we obtain the
following result.
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Lemma 6.
lim
∆→0
(
H(B1|A2, A3)−H(B1|B0, B2, B3)
)
= h(A1|A2, A3)− h(A1|A0, A2, A3) = I(A0;A1|A2, A3), (70)
lim
∆→0
(
H(B2|A1, A3)−H(B2|B0, B1, B3)
)
= h(A2|A1, A3)− h(A2|A0, A1, A3) = I(A0;A2|A1, A3), (71)
lim
∆→0
(
H(B1|A2, A3) +H(B2|A1, A3)−H(B1, B2|B0, B3)
)
= h(A1|A2, A3) + h(A2|A1, A3)− h(A1, A2|A0, A3) = I(A0;A1, A2|A3)− I(A1;A2|A3). (72)
The proof of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix C.
Invoking Lemma 6 and letting δ ↓ 0, we have shown that average over all the random codebooks controlled by random
variables X5, if (R1, R2) ∈ R
∗, then (21), (22) and (23) are satisfied and thus (R1, R2) is an achievable private key rate pair.
The argument that there exists a deterministic codebook satisfying (21), (22) and (23) can be done similarly as [12] and thus
omitted.
V. PROOF OF COROLLARY 3
A. Preliminaries
For S ⊆ T and W ⊆ Ac, let
H(S|W) := {U ⊆ Wc : U 6= ∅, S 6⊆ U}, (73)
Hi(S|W) := {U ⊆ W
c : U 6= ∅, S 6⊆ U , i ∈ U}, (74)
Λ(S|W) := {λ :
∑
U∈Hi(S|W)
λU = 1, ∀ i ∈ W
c : Hi(S|W) 6= ∅}. (75)
Similarly as [22, Lemma 3.2], we can prove the following result.
Lemma 7. Fix an integer n. Let Z be a random variable jointly distributed with AnT .
(i) For any λ ∈ Λ(S|W), we have
h(AnT |A
n
W , Z)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |h
n
Uc , Z) ≥ 0; (76)
(ii) For any t ∈ Wc, let Vt be a function of (Xt, Z), then for any λ ∈ Λ(S|W),
h(AnT |A
n
W , Z)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc , Z)
= h(AnT |A
n
W , Z, Vt)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc , Z, Vt) +
∑
U∈Ht(S|W)
I(Vt;A
n
Uc
⋂
Wc |A
n
W , Z). (77)
B. Converse Proof
Fix any secret key protocol with public message F such that (21) to (24) are satisfied. We first consider keys KA and KBA
only to derive an upper bound for R1. Invoking (21) to (24), we have that for sufficiently large n and any positive δ,
Pr{KA 6= KBA} ≤ δ, (78)
D(PKAAn2An3 F‖UK1 × PAn2An3F) ≤ δ, (79)
1
n
H(KA) ≥ R1 − δ. (80)
Recall that F = (F1, . . . , F4r) are the total communication of r and Fj is a function of A
n
t and F
j−1 where t = j mod 4.
Let F1 := {Fj : j mod 4 = 0 or 1} and F2 = Fc1. Set T = 4, T = {0, 1, 2, 3}, S = {0, 1}, W = 2 and W = {2, 3}. Thus,
H(S|W) = {{0}, {1}}. Invoking (73) to (75), we obtain that
h(An0 , A
n
1 |A
n
2 , A
n
3 )− h(A
n
0 |A
n
1 , A
n
2 , A
n
3 )− h(A
n
1 |A
n
0 , A
n
2 , A
n
3 ) = h(A
n
T |A
n
W )− max
λ∈Λ(S|W)
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc). (81)
Invoking (77) with Z = ∅ and V0 = F0 and noting that the summation of mutual information terms are non-negative, we
obtain that
h(AnT |A
n
W)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc) ≥ h(A
n
T |A
n
W , F0)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc , F0) (82)
11
≥ h(AnT |A
n
W , F0, F1)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc , F0, F1) (83)
≥ h(AnT |A
n
W ,F1)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc ,F1) (84)
= h(AnT |A
n
W ,F)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc ,F), (85)
where (83) follows by invoking (77) with Z = F0 and V1 = F1; (84) follows by invoking (77) for r(T −W ) times successively;
(85) follows because
h(AnT |A
n
W ,F1) = h(A
n
T |A
n
W ,F1, FT−W ) (86)
= h(AnT |A
n
W ,F1, FT−W , FT−W+1) (87)
= . . . (88)
= h(AnT |A
n
W ,F1,F2), (89)
and
h(AnU |A
n
Uc ,F1) = h(A
n
U |A
n
Uc ,F), (90)
where (86) follows since FT−W is a function of A
n
W and F1; (87) follow since FT−W+1 is a function of (F1, A
n
W , FT−W )
and (89) follows by using the same idea successively for WT times.
Note that KA is a function of A
n
1 and F. Continuing from (85) and invoking (77) in Lemma 7 with t = 1, Z = F, V1 = KA,
we obtain that
h(AnT |A
n
W ,F)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc ,F)
= h(AnT |A
n
W ,F,KA)−
∑
U∈H(S|W)
λUh(A
n
U |A
n
Uc ,F,KA) +
∑
U∈H1(S|W)
I(KA;A
n
Uc
⋂
Wc |A
n
W ,F) (91)
≥
∑
U∈H1(S|W)
I(KA;A
n
Uc
⋂
Wc |A
n
W ,F) (92)
= I(KA;A
n
1 |A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F) (93)
= h(KA|A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F)− h(KA|A
n
1 , A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F) (94)
= h(KA)− I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F) (95)
≥ h(KA)− δ. (96)
where (92) follows from (76) in Lemma 7 by setting Z = (F,KA); (93) follows from the settings T = {0, 1, 2, 3}, S = {0, 1},
W = {2, 3}, and H1(S|W) = {{1}}; (95) follows since KA is the function of An1 and F; (96) follow by noting that
I(KA;A
n
2A
n
3F) ≤ D(PKAAn2An3F‖UK1 × PAn2An3 F) ≤ δ and using (79).
Therefore, invoking (85) and (96), we conclude that
R1 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KA) (97)
≤ lim inf
n→∞
(
I(A0;A1|A2, A3) +
δ
n
)
(98)
= I(A0;A1|A2, A3). (99)
Similarly as (99), by considering the generation of KC and KBC only, we obtain that
R2 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
H(KC) ≤ I(A0;A2|A1, A3). (100)
Finally, we derive the bound on the sum rate. Invoking (21), we obtain that for any δ,
Pr
{
(KA,KC) 6= (KBA,KBC)
}
≤ max
{
Pr{KA 6= KBA},Pr{KC 6= KBC}
}
(101)
≤ 2δ. (102)
Recall that KA is a function of (F, A
n
1 ) and KC is a function of (F, A
n
2 ). Invoking (22) and (23), we obtain that
2δ ≥ D(PKAAn2An3F‖UK1 × PAn2An3 F) +D(PKCAn1An3F‖UK2 × PAn1An3 F) (103)
= D(PKA‖UK1) +D(PKC‖UK2) + I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F) + I(KC;A
n
1 , A
n
3 ,F) (104)
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= D(PKA‖UK1) +D(PKC‖UK2) + I(KA;KC, A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F) + I(KC;A
n
1 , A
n
3 ,F) (105)
= D(PKA‖UK1) +D(PKC‖UK2) + I(KA;KC) + I(KA;A
n
2 , A
n
3 ,F|Kc) + I(KC;A
n
1 , A
n
3 ,F) (106)
≥ D(PKA‖UK1) +D(PKC‖UK2) + I(KA;KC) + I(KA;A
n
3 ,F|Kc) + I(KC;A
n
3 ,F) (107)
= D(PKAKCAn3F‖UK1 × UK2 × PAn3 F), (108)
and
δ ≥ D(PKAAn2An3 F‖UK1 × PAn2An3F) (109)
≥ I(KA;KC). (110)
Thus, we have
lim inf
n→∞
1
n
h(KAKC) = lim inf
n→∞
1
n
(h(KA) + h(KC)− I(KA;KC)) (111)
≥ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
(h(KA) + h(KC)− δ) (112)
≥ R1 +R2. (113)
Then, let us consider a super terminal observing (An1 , A
n
2 ) and generate private keys (KA,KC). With the requirement in
(102), (108), similarly as (99), we conclude that
R1 +R2 ≤ lim inf
n→∞
1
n
h(KAKC) ≤ I(A0;A1, A2|A3) + 4δ. (114)
The proof of Corollary 3 is now complete.
VI. CONCLUSION
We first presented the output statistics of hash functions under the Re´nyi divergence criterion in Lemma 1. Lemma 1 is
a generalization of the result in [11] to the multi terminal case and the strict generalization of the output statistics in [30,
Theorem 1] where the variation distance is used as the security measure. Subsequently, we illustrated the power of Lemma 1 in
analyzing secrecy constraints by deriving the capacity region of the multiple private key generation problem with a helper for
CMS. The converse proof follows by judiciously adapting the techniques in [22] to the case with correlated side information
at untrusted terminals.
We then briefly discuss the future research directions. First, one can apply Lemma 1 to analyze secrecy constraints for
other key generation problems for CMS, such as the multi-terminal private key generation problem [4, Theorem 2] and the
secret-private key generation problem with three terminals [16]. Furthermore, as shown in Theorems 2, 4 and Corollary 3,
the capacity region for multiple private key generation is not tight in general. One may nail down the exact capacity region.
Second, one may derive second-order asymptotics for multi-terminal key generation problems and thus extend the results of
[9]. In order to do so, for private key generation problems, one can potentially refer to [7], [8] to derive the converse part and
extend the achievability scheme in [9] to the multi-terminal case. Note that in [8], [9], the secrecy measure is the variational
distance. Finally, one can explore the fundamental limits of the key generation problems with Re´nyi divergence as the security
measure, as proposed in [28]. For capacity results, the achievability part can probably be done by using Lemma 1 or extending
the results in [28].
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
For simplicity, we consider n = 1 and discrete variable E (i.e., E is finite). The case for continuous variable E and for any
n ∈ N can be done similarly by replacing the summation over e ∈ E with corresponding integrals and using the i.i.d. nature
of source sequences. For simplicity, we use AT to denote
∏
t∈T At, MT to denote
∏
t∈T Mt and 1{fXT (aT ) = mT } to
denote
∏
t∈T 1{fXt(at) = mt} for all aT ∈ AT and mT ∈ MT . Given aT ∈ AT , for any subset S of T , define
BS := {a¯T : a¯S = aS , and ∀ t /∈ S, a¯t 6= at}. (115)
Thus, we have
AT =
⋃
∅6=S⊆T
BS . (116)
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1) Proof of Claim (i): Fix aT and e. For any non-empty set S ⊆ T , we have that
EXT
[ ∑
a¯T ∈BS
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
]
≤ PAS |E(aS |e)×
∏
t∈(T −S)
ε
Nt
, (117)
where (117) follows from the ε-almost universal property of hash functions fXt for all t ∈ T . Similarly, if S = ∅, then we
have
EXT
[ ∑
a¯T ∈BS
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
]
≤
∏
t∈T
ε
Nt
. (118)
Therefore, invoking (117) and (118), we obtain that
EXT
[∑
a¯T
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
]
= EXT
[ ∑
S⊆T
∑
a¯T ∈BS
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
]
(119)
=
∑
S⊆T
EXT
[ ∑
a¯T ∈BS
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
]
(120)
≤
∑
∅6=S⊆T
PAS |E(aS |e)×
∏
t∈(T −S)
ε
Nt
+
∏
t∈T
ε
Nt
. (121)
Thus, we obtain that
EXT
[
exp(−sH1+s(MT |E)
]
= EXT
[∑
e
PE(e)
∑
mT ∈MT
(∑
aT
1{fXT (aT ) = mT }PAT |E(aT |e)
)1+s]
(122)
= EXT
[∑
e
PE(e)
∑
aT
PAT |E(aT |e)
(∑
a¯T
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
)s]
(123)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
aT
PAT |E(aT |e)
(
EXT
[∑
a¯T
1{fXT (a¯T ) = fXT (aT )}PAT |E(a¯T |e)
])s
(124)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
aT
PAT |E(aT |e)
( ∑
∅6=S⊆T
PAS |E(aS |e)×
∏
t∈(T −S)
ε
Nt
+
∏
t∈T
ε
Nt
)s
(125)
≤
∑
e
PE(e)
∑
aT
PAT |E(aT |e)
( ∑
∅6=S⊆T
P sAS |E(aS |e)
∏
t∈(T −S)
εs
Nst
+
∏
t∈T
εs
Nst
)
(126)
≤
∏
t∈T
εs
Nst
+
∑
∅6=S⊆T
( ∏
t∈(T −S)
εs
Nst
)(∑
e
PE(e)
∑
aS
P 1+s
AS |E
(aS |e)
)
(127)
=
∏
t∈T
εs
Nst
+
∑
∅6=S⊆T
( ∏
t∈(T −S)
εs
Nst
)
exp(−sH1+s(AS |E)). (128)
where (124) follows from the concavity of the function ts for s ∈ [0, 1]; (125) follows from (4) and (121); (126) follows from
the inequality (
∑
i ai)
s ≤
∑
i a
s
i for s ∈ [0, 1] [37, Problem 4.15(f)]; (128) follows from the definition in (4).
Invoking (11) and (128), we conclude that
EXT
[
exp(sC1+s(MT |E))
]
= EXT
[
exp
(
s
∑
t∈T
logNt − sH1+s(MT |E)
)]
(129)
≤
(∏
t∈T
Nst
)
×
(∏
t∈T
εs
Nst
+
∑
∅6=S⊆T
( ∏
t∈(T −S)
εs
Nst
)
exp(−sH1+s(AS |E))
)
(130)
= εsT +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
εs(T−|S|)
(∏
i∈S
Nst
)
exp(−sH1+s(AS |E)). (131)
The proof of Claim (i) is thus completed.
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2) Proof of Claim (ii): Recall that
logNt = nRt. (132)
Given any s ∈ (0, 1] and any ε ∈ R+, we have
EXT
[
C1+s(MT |E
n)
]
≤
1
s
log
(
EXT
[
exp(sC1+s(MT |E))
])
(133)
≤
1
s
log
(
εsT +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
εs(T−|S|) exp
(
− sn
(
H1+s(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
)))
(134)
≤ |T log ε|+
1
s
log
(
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
exp
(
− sn
(
H1+s(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
)))
, (135)
where (133) follows since exp(EXT
[
sC1+s(MT |E)
]
) ≤ EXT [exp(sC1+s(MT |E))] due to the convexity of exp(z) in z ∈ R;
(134) follows from the result in (131) and the fact that (AnS , E
n) are a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, leading to
H1+s(A
n
S |E
n) = nH1+s(AS |E); (135) follows since i) log(z) is increasing in z ∈ R+ and ii) for any ε ∈ R+, with
g(S) := exp
(
− sn
(
H1+s(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S Rt
)
, if ε ∈ (0, 1], then
εsT +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
εs(T−|S|)g(S) ≤ 1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
g(S) (136)
and if ε > 1, then
εsT +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
εs(T−|S|)g(S) ≤ εsT ×
(
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
g(S)
)
. (137)
The proof of Claim (ii) is completed by invoking (135).
B. Proof of Claim (iii)
We then proceed to prove (15). From now on, we take ε = 1 and thus consider universal2 hash functions. For any s ∈ (0, 1]
and θ ∈ [s, 1], using (131), we obtain that
EXT
[
C1+s(MT |E
n)
]
≤ EXT
[
C1+θ(MT |E
n)
]
(138)
≤
1
θ
log
(
1 +
∑
∅6=S⊆T
(∏
i∈S
M ri θ
)
× exp(−rH1+θ(A
n
S |E
n))
)
(139)
≤
1
r
∑
∅6=S⊆T
exp
(
− nθ
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
))
(140)
≤
2T − 1
θ
× max
∅6=S⊆T
exp
(
− nθ
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
))
(141)
=
2T − 1
θ
× exp
(
− nθ min
∅6=S⊆T
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
))
. (142)
Thus, invoking (142), we obtain that for s ∈ (0, 1], we have
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEXT
[
C1+s(MT |E
n)
]
≥ max
θ∈(s,1]
min
∅6=S⊆T
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
)
. (143)
Invoking (135), we obtain that C1+s(MT |En) = O(n) Thus, recalling that C1+s(·) is non-decreasing in s, we obtain that
for s = 0,
lim inf
n→∞
−
1
n
logEXT
[
C1+s(MT |E
n)
]
≥ min{0, max
θ∈(0,1]
θ min
∅6=S⊆T
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
)
} (144)
= max
θ∈[0,1]
θ min
∅6=S⊆T
(
H1+θ(AS |E)−
∑
t∈S
Rt
)
. (145)
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C. Proof of Lemma 6
Here we only provide the proof of (70) since (71) and (72) can be proved similarly. Recall that for t = 0, 1, 2, 3, Bt is the
quantized version of At, i.e., Bt = gq(At). Define an auxiliary random variable B4 :=
∏3
t=1 1{Bt 6= 0}. Then we have that
H(B1|A2, A3) = H(B1, B4|A2, A3)−H(B4|B1, A2, A3) (146)
= H(B1, B4|A2, A3) (147)
= H(B4|A2, A3) +H(B1|A2, A3, B4). (148)
where (147) follows since B4 is function of (B1, B2, B3) and Bt is a function of At for t = 2, 3. Note that (A2, A3) −
(B1, B2, B3)−B4 and B1 −A1 − (A2, A3)− (B2, B3) form Markov chains. Hence, for any (a2, a3, b1, b2, b3) ∈ R2 × B3,
PA32B31B4(a2, a3, b
3
1, 1) = PA32(a
3
2)PB32 |A32(b
3
2|a
3
2)PB1|A32(b1|a
3
2)PB4|B31 (1|b
3
1) (149)
= PA32(a
3
2)×
3∏
t=2
1{bt = gq(at)}PB1|A32(b1|a
3
2)×
3∏
t=1
1{bt 6= 0} (150)
Thus, PA32B31B4(a
3
2, b
3
1, 1) is non-zero if and only if gq(at) 6= 0 for t = 1, 2 and bt = 1 for t = 1, 2, 3. Let
η(a32) := PB4|A32(0|a
3
2). (151)
Thus,
H(B1, B2, B3|A2 = a2, A3 = a3, B4 = 1)
= −
∑
b31∈{1,...,2q
2}3
PA32B31B4(a
3
2, b
3
1, 1)
PA32B4(a
3
2, 1)
log
PA32B31B4(a
3
2, b
3
1, 1)
PA32B4(a
3
2, 1)
(152)
= −
∑
b1∈{1,...,2q2}
PB1|A32(b1|a
3
2)
1− η(a32)
log
PB1|A32(b1|a
3
2)
1− η(a32)
(153)
=
log(1− η(a32))
1− η(a32)
−
1
1− η(a32)
∑
b1∈{1,...,2q2}
PA1|A32(g
−1
q (b1)|a
3
2)∆ logPA1|A32(a1|a
3
2)∆ (154)
=
log(1− η(a32))
1− η(a32)
−
log∆
1− η(a32)
∑
b1∈{1,...,2q2}
PA1|A32(g
−1
q (b1)|a
3
2)∆
−
1
1− η(a32)
∑
b1∈{1,...,2q2}
PA1|A32(g
−1
q (b1)|a
3
2)∆ logPA1|A32(a1|a
3
2), (155)
where (154) follows from the mean value theorem, which states that for some a1 such that gq(a1) = b1,
PB1|A32(b1|a
3
2) =
∫
a1:(b1−1)∆−q<a1≤b1∆−q
PA1|A32(a1|a
3
2)da1 (156)
= PA1|A32(a1|a
3
2)∆. (157)
Let Σ1 be the variance of A1. Similarly as [22, (66)-(67)], we obtain that as ∆ =
1
q
↓ 0, for any (a2, a3)
η(a32) = PB4|A32(0|a
3
2) (158)
=
3∏
t=2
1{g(at) = 0} × Pr{B1 = 0} (159)
=
3∏
t=2
1{g(at) = 0} × Pr{A1 /∈ [−q, q]} (160)
≤ exp
(
−
q2
2Σ1
−
1
2
log 2piΣ1
)
→ 0. (161)
Let hb(x) := −x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) be the binary entropy function for x ∈ [0, 1]. Invoking (161), we obtain that
lim
∆→0
H(B4|A2, A3) = lim
∆→0
∫
a32
PA32(a
3
2)H(B4|a
3
2)da32 (162)
≤ lim
∆→0
∫
a32
PA32(a
3
2)hb(η(a
3
2))da32 = 0. (163)
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Invoking (155), (161) and noting that Bt is a function of At for t = 2, 3, we obtain that
lim
∆→0
H(B1|A2, A3, B4) = lim
∆→0
H(B1, B2, B3|A2, A3, B4) (164)
= lim
∆→0
(∫
a32
PA32(a
3
2)PB4|A32(0|a
3
2)H(B1|A2 = a2, A3 = a3, B4 = 0)da32
+
∫
a32
PA32(a
3
2)PB4|A32(1|a
3
2)H(B2|A2 = a2, A3 = a3, B4 = 1)da32
)
(165)
= h(A1|A2, A3). (166)
Therefore, invoking (148), (163), (166), we obtain that
lim
∆→0
H(B1|A2, A3) = h(A1|A2, A3). (167)
The proof of (70) is complete if we show that
lim
∆→0
H(B1|B0, B2, B3) = h(A1|A0, A2, A3). (168)
For this purpose, define B5 =
∏3
t=0 1{Bt 6= 0} and B6 :=
∏
t∈{0,2,3}{Bt 6= 0}. Then, we have
H(B1|B0, B2, B3) = H(B
3
0)−H(B0, B2, B3) (169)
= H(B30 , B5)−H(B0, B2, B3, B6) (170)
= H(B5) +H(B
3
0 |B5)−H(B6)−H(B0, B2, B3|B6). (171)
Similarly as [22, Equation (67)], we can show that for t = 5, 6,
lim
∆→0
Pr{Bt = 0} = 0. (172)
Hence, we obtain that
lim
∆→0
H(B5) = 0, (173)
lim
∆→0
H(B6) = 0. (174)
Furthermore, invoking [22, Equation (18)], we conclude that
lim
∆→0
H(B30 |B5) = lim
∆→0
H(B30 |B5 = 1) = h(A
3
0) (175)
lim
∆→0
H(B0, B2, B3|B6) = lim
∆→0
H(B0, B2, B3|B6 = 1) (176)
= h(A0, A2, A3). (177)
The proof of (168) is complete by invoking (171) and (173) to (177).
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